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Abstract 
Executives need to master different mechanisms for analyzing their firms’ investment 
opportunities in uncertain, difficult times.  Rapidly changing business conditions require firms to 
move quickly, with total commitment and the rapid deployment of capital, resources, and 
management attention, often in several directions at the same time.  However, high levels of 
strategic uncertainty and environmental risk, combined with limits on available funding, require 
firms to limit their commitment.  In brief we require high levels of strategic commitment to 
numerous projects, while simultaneously preserving our flexibility and withholding commitment.  
While achieving both is clearly impossible, techniques exist that enable executives (1) to identify 
and to delimit their range of investment alternatives that must be considered, and to do so rapidly 
and reliably; (2) to divide investments into discrete stages that can be implemented sequentially; 
(3) to determine which chunks can safely and profitably be developed as strategic options, with 
value that can be captured when subsequent stage investments are made later; and (4) to quantify 
and to estimate the value of these strategic options with a significant degree of accuracy, so that 
selections can be made from a portfolio of investment alternatives.  This paper also avoids 
restrictions of common option valuation models by providing a technique that is general enough 
to be used when the data required by common models are not available or the assumptions are 
not satisfied. 
1. Introduction 
Technological innovations in shopping, distribution, and entertainment that outstrip consumers’ 
ability to adopt them, cultural and military conflicts polarized by recent events in the middle east, 
and unprecedented stock market volatility combine to create an increasing sense of strategic 
uncertainty.  Executives are concerned about implementing the infrastructure that they may need 
  
to take advantage of market opportunities as they arise.  They are equally concerned with 
avoiding any unnecessary investments in technology infrastructure in support of market 
opportunities that do not arise.  They are trading off the desire for speed (“we have no time to 
waste”) with the desire for certainty before acting (“we have no resources to waste”).  This 
requires a methodology for justifying investments in assets that will be required only under 
specific sets of conditions, and for enabling rapid deployment of these assets when they are 
required.  We call such investments contingent investments. 
We develop a general framework that permits evaluation of a contingent IT investment; that is, 
we provide a technique that allows a firm to estimate the value on a technology investment that 
enables the future deployment of a strategy should conditions arise that make this strategy 
desirable.  The set of conditions that may cause a strategy to become desirable includes 
environmental factors such as the behavior of customers, and game theoretic factors, such as the 
actions of competitors.  The generality of this framework forces us to make a trade-off between 
deriving closed form solutions with overly demanding restrictions on the set of conditions and 
providing heuristic evaluations for general conditions without such restrictions.  Since our 
intention is to provide business practitioners a useful tool for evaluating contingent investments 
and to make these tools sufficiently general to incorporate truly innovative applications of 
information technology, we find imposing arbitrary restrictions on business conditions 
inconsistent with our objectives.  Instead, we establish an economic model for the general 
framework, within which it is possible to provide arbitrary complex sets of conditions as inputs 
and to use computer simulations and other numerical methods to evaluate ex ante values of 
contingent investment strategies given these conditions.  
  
2. Maintaining Strategic Flexibility: Achieving Speed while Deferring Commitment 
It is not too difficult in principle to determine the value that a firm may receive from obtaining in 
advance the resources that it would need to deploy a specific strategy at a future time.  In order to 
determine such value, you would need to: 
• Delineate your set of alternative business contexts.  This entails determining what 
condition θ  a firm might face in terms of regulation, customer preferences, technological 
advances, or new entrants at time t.  The specific set of conditions revealed at time t will 
be represented by Θ∈θ  and the likelihood that a given condition θ  happens is 
represented by Π∈θπ .2   
•  Delineate your set of strategic responses.   This entails determining:  (1) the set of 
possible strategies Σ∈s  to be pursued; and (2) the benefits, or the financial and 
competitive payoff, from selecting a particular strategy ( )s,θβ  at time t when θ  is 
known.  
                                            
2 Alternative contexts can be identified through scenario analysis.  Actions may be needed in one scenario but 
unnecessary or even dangerous in another.  These contingent possibilities, those things that we can identify now as 
possibly useful at a later time, yield the most interesting investment decisions.  For example, it may be useful for an 
insurance company that will be operating in some future, fully deregulated environment to have detailed predictions 
of expected claims associated with individuals who have different family backgrounds, different ethnic 
backgrounds, and different individual genetic predisposition to expensive medical conditions.  Even attempting to 
maintain such information today would be considered morally repugnant to most of western society and would 
produce significant loss of brand image and customer loyalty. Increasingly, scenario analysis is used to predict the 
range of possible future environments, so that the range of systems they will require can be determined in advance 
(e.g., Clemons [6], Schoemaker [24], Schwartz [25], Wack [28, 29]).   Delimiting strategic alternatives through 
scenario analysis is the most subjective and least precise portion of our methodology.  We are indeed aware that 
failure to identify a significant future state of the world can entirely preclude consideration of an entire class of 
strategies.  Additionally, by ignoring some outcomes with non-zero probabilities it can cause us to overestimate the 
probabilities of other outcomes, and thus can result in substantial bias in our estimates of the value of some 
investments.  However, scenario analysis at present appears to be among the best available mechanisms for 
delimiting θ and β.  
  
•  Determine the optimal strategy for each θ  at time t and let this be 
( ) ( )ss
s
,maxarg* θβθ =  and determine the resources that must be deployed to implement 
that strategy. 
•  Calculate the difference between the returns from the best strategy (when the resources 
are available) and the returns from the best alternative strategy (when the resources are 
not available); both are evaluated for the same set of conditions represented by θ .  This 
difference is the value ( )θυ  of having the appropriate resources for ( )θ*s , given that θ  
actually describes the environment at time t.  (Of course, if ( )θ*s  does not require the 
resources, then ( )θυ   is zero.) 
Thus, if (1) the set of future environments Θ and Π  were known and (2) adequate models were 
available to determine the value of a strategy in each of these specific future environments, then 
we can calculate the value of the resources needed to deploy that strategy.  This could be done 
simply by comparing the expected values created by the best strategies that could be deployed 
with and without those resources.  This tells us the value of strategies once resources are known, 
but tells us little about preparing in advance, or developing a plan for committing resources.  In 
this paper, we suggest that firms do not need to make full commitment of resources beforehand.  
Instead, firms can identify investment opportunities early, evaluate them accurately, and where 
justified commit resources that enable a fast response in case a given strategy needs to be 
implemented at some future time.  That is, we provide a mechanism for enabling rapid response, 
with a set of actions we can take now, so that when θ  is revealed at time t we are able to take the 
correct context-specific actions quickly. 
Obtaining future flexibility while withholding expensive full commitment until requirements are 
known is facilitated by initially laying the groundwork for future actions through what we might 
  
have called strategy-enabling partial investments.  These partial investments cost less than com-
plete acquisition of the full set of necessary resources.  Importantly, they enable speed of action 
when the appropriate course of action can be determined and they allow delaying full spending 
on necessary investments until it is clear which investments are required.  When future 
conditions become known and requirements become clear, contingent IT investments can now be 
made.  The initial investments are properly viewed as strategic options, while completing the 
future contingent investments can best be seen as exercising the strategic options created by 
initial investments. 
3. Review of the Literature 
An option is simply the right to obtain an asset at later time, at a pre-specified price (call) or the 
right to sell an asset at a later time, at a pre-specified price (put).  Different forms of options have 
been identified and studied in the literature. 
3.1. Financial Options 
A financial option is the right to trade a financial asset at a future time and at a predetermined 
price.  These can be considered “context-independent” “common value” assets; the value of an 
option to buy shares of IBM or US Treasury bills at a specified price is the same for all investors, 
and this value is determined solely by the difference between the value of the shares and the 
strike price of the option when it is exercised.  Valuation of financial options requires existence 
of arbitrage-free markets where the underlying assets are traded.  Using market prices of the 
underlying assets and their return variances, a number of option price models have been 
proposed, among which are the commonly used binomial model in discrete time due to Cox and 
  
Rubinstein [11] and Black-Scholes model in continuous time due to Fischer Black and Myron 
Scholes [4].3  
3.2. Real Options 
In its purest sense, a real option is the right to trade a physical asset, such as real estate or 
manufactured durables such as aircraft, at a future time and at a predetermined price.4 These are 
not common value instruments, in the sense that an option to upgrade a fleet of aircraft will have 
different values to different airlines depending upon their size and the age of their fleets; 
likewise, the value of an option to build a hotel near an airport will have different values to 
different hotel chains depending upon their targeted market segments and the nature of their 
existing offerings near the airport.    This greatly complicates any effort at valuation.  Like 
financial options, the greater the volatility in demand, the more valuable the option to take deliv-
ery without delay; these options are valuable because of the future flexibility of action that they 
confer, and thus the value of these options is dependent upon uncertainty in the cost and 
availability of assets and upon uncertainty in the value of their deployment.  Myers introduced 
the concept of real options [21].  Trigeorigis [27] provides an excellent treatment of real options 
in investment decisions.   
A large body of research on real options focuses on applying financial option pricing models to 
evaluating real options.  However, real options differ from financial options in one critical 
aspect: there exist no arbitrage-free markets where underlying assets are traded.  All applications 
                                            
3  Since a financial option is an investment that supports flexibility — the right to trade an investment at a specified 
price at some future time — it is not surprising that the value of the option increases as a function of the value of 
flexibility.  The value of flexibility naturally increases with the volatility of the underlying instrument — if shares of 
IBM always traded at $140 and US Treasuries were always $10,000 — an option conferring the right to trade them 
at $140 and $10,000 respectively would have no value. 
4  Many researchers also include in this category actions that enhance strategic flexibility, such as learning or initial 
experiments with early market entry; we find it useful to make a distinction between real options as we have defined 
them, and strategic options, which we introduce in the next section; we trust this will cause no confusion among our 
readers. 
  
of option pricing models require identifying “twin assets” that is theoretically perfectly 
correlated with the underlying assets of the real options and use their prices and return variances 
in the pricing models.  Critics to real options approach often dismiss such choice of “twin assets” 
arbitrary and useless.  Indeed, twin assets are used as a quick way of forcing the applicability of 
traditional financial options valuation techniques by attempting to find a source of historical 
distributions that can be applied analogously to Black-Scholes.  However, even were such assets 
to exist, this would fail to capture the firm-specific valuation essential to real options theory.  
Significantly, real options theory, in fact, does not dictate use of any particular pricing models.  It 
is simply an approach that recognizes the value of management flexibility in investment 
evaluation.  This paper takes an alternative approach with regard to valuation while staying true 
to the principal of real options theory.  Moreover, as Trigeorigis [27] points out, options pricing 
models usually provide a single risk-adjusted expected value that is consistent with the objective 
of maximizing firms’ market capitalization.  Project managers’ decision criteria, however, are 
often not aligned with maximizing firms’ market capitalization.  Instead of providing managers 
merely a single expected value adjusted by market’s risk acceptance level, our model provides 
managers with a distribution of the value of the investment and let the mangers make risk 
adjustments based on their preferences. 
3.3 Strategic Options 
The concept underlying our approach has been widely used in strategic management literatures 
in the form of strategic options.  A strategic option represents a capability to deploy a selected 
strategy.  Rather than being purchased, these capabilities are synthesized by making the 
investments that will be needed for rapid deployment of the strategy later, if and when it is 
  
desired.5  Deciding not to implement the strategy has much in common with choosing not 
exercise a real option, and much of the analysis used in real options theory is therefore 
applicable.  Strategic options are context-specific rather than common-value.  For example, a 
strategy based on customer relationship management and individualized service will have 
different value for chains like the Ritz Carlton or the Inter-Continental, whose clientele expect 
the most careful attention to their specific individual needs and preferences, than it would for 
more mass-market chains like Marriott Courtyard or Holiday Inn.  
Financial options provide inspiration but do not directly suggest how strategic options might be 
valued.  No “twin assets” are available to offer much guidance when attempting to value 
strategic options:  the first airline to develop an online distribution strategy was not able to find 
any assets that mimic either the benefits from customer adoption or the potential losses from 
retaliation from travel agents concerned with the loss of business that online distribution might 
represent [8].   There were no traded assets that mimic the value for many strategic systems 
investments, nor were there reasonable surrogates (there was no known distribution, with known 
mean and variance, for the pricing strategies employed by Capital One [9] or for the regulation 
that could be applied to the insurance industry in the face of improved genetic testing capabilities 
by individuals [10]).6  Moreover, unlike financial options where the value is determined by a 
large, anonymous, exogenous marketplace, the variance of value in strategic options at least to 
some extent is endogenous, and is heavily contingent on the timing of our actions and of the 
actions of competitors [16, 17]    
3.4. Contingent IT Investments as Strategic Options 
                                            
5 Other authors in the strategy area, particularly Bowman and Hurry [5], Mitchell and Hamilton [20], and Kogut [17] 
have used the term strategic option much as we have here.  
6 Capital One is the first credit card issuer in the US that uses differential pricing strategy in determining customers’ 
interest rates.  See Clemons and Thatcher [8] for more details. 
  
MIS researchers have studied the idea that investments in IT need to be valued and justified since 
at least the early 1970s.  Some systems could clearly be justified because they were necessary to 
the timely conduct of business.  Others were more subjective, and required valuing the 
information produced by the systems [13].   Dos Santos [12] applies real options theory to 
making IT investments, dividing the investment into two stages and treating the first stage as an 
option on the speedy deployment of the second.  He assumes distributions on both the benefits 
and costs of exercising the option (making the second stage investment).  Kulatilaka and Perotti 
[18] study investment in technology options in the presence of competition, and determine that in 
the presence of competition options are exercised sooner (to achieve competitive benefits) but 
total benefits to innovators are reduced (due to competition).  Benaroch and Kauffman [2, 3] 
provide an excellent example of applying option valuation model in real business environments.  
Zhu [30] studies IT options, rather than technological options more generally, and derives similar 
results.  Huchzermeier and Loch [14] apply a sequential decision analysis framework to a multi-
stage investment process, where additional information becomes available on five sources of risk 
(market payoff, project budget, product performance, market requirements, and project schedule) 
at each stage in the process and use dynamic programming to determine the options value.  
Tallon et. al. [26] provide an excellent overview of real options research in the IS field. 
 
3.5. Sequential Decision Theory and Statistical Decision Theory 
  
Perhaps the earliest work directly related to the valuation technique we use is statistical decision 
analysis, pioneered by Raiffa and Schlaifer in the 1960s [22, 23].  Their idea was simple but 
powerful:  analyzing ex ante the effects of taking a sequence of decisions, and allowing the 
combination of actions made based on previous decisions and the evolving state of the world to 
create a decision tree.  The end nodes of the tree could be evaluated, weighted by their ex ante 
probabilities, and summed, to determine the best initial course of action.  Trigeorigis [26] shows 
that option valuation models are themselves special cases of decision tree analysis.  Much of 
what we do below is based on this idea.  
4. Sequential Decision Making and Strategic Chunkification 
Some systems investments can be divided into segments, tasks, or chunks that can be 
implemented sequentially.  To coin a term that is easy to remember, we call dividing a 
contingent IT investment opportunity into chunks strategic chunkification; the first chunk is 
made because the contingent investment may prove very useful, while the second chunk of 
investment is made only when it is known that the contingent investment will be useful.  
Development of the initial tasks can be undertaken early, perhaps immediately, and surely before 
there is certainty that the full project will be required.  Later tasks can be undertaken when the 
state of the future (the emergent scenario) is clearer, or perhaps, is revealed with certainty.  If the 
investment in the early tasks is limited, and if the investment in these tasks will result in a 
substantial reduction in time to complete the entire systems implementation process, then 
completing these early tasks can be viewed as creating strategic options.  The cost of 
implementation of the early tasks can be viewed as paying an option premium; the benefits from 
rapid completion of systems development, such as early market share gains resulting from early 
deployment, can be considered the benefits from exercising an option that is in the money. 
  
We can be more specific.  Consider preparation for a future strategy, where the act of preparing 
requires two tasks, which require investments E1 and E2 respectively.  Investment E1 has duration 
of L1 and investment E2 has duration of L2.   
• The options premium, or the cost of the option, can be estimated by E1, the cost 
associated with the investment needed to complete the first task. 
• The value of the option will be more difficult to estimate in a meaningful fashion.  It is 
determined by the value of the sequence of investments E1 at t1, E2 at t2, compared to the 
value of both investments made beginning at t2.  While this value cannot actually be 
determined, business simulation modeling can be most effective, when factors such as 
response time and adoption rate of customers, and the value of first mover advantages, 
can be incorporated.  This will be explored in more detail in Sections 5 and 6. 
Making first phase investment reduces firm’s response time in case changes in environmental 
conditions make the overall investment necessary.  The reduction in time will frequently be 
close to L1, the time required to complete implementation of the first task and thus the duration 
of the first phase.  (Assuming that both tasks would need be performed sequentially, the eventual 
completion of sequence {E1, E2} when needed would be accelerated by L1 if the first task were 
performed in advance, before it was required.)   Thus, the value of advanced preparation can be 
determined by calculating the value of the difference between the optimal strategy ( )*, sθβ  that 
would be pursued with the enabling investment E1 completed in advance if the state of the world 
were revealed to be θ  at time t2 and the best alternative strategy s in θ  that could pursued if E1 
had not been completed.  This computation needs to be performed for all states of the world 
Θ∈θ , integrating over probability distributions for the state of the world θπ  and the time at 
which it is revealed. 
  
5. Model 
We use the credit card industry to illustrate derivation of our model and its practical applications.  
Credit card companies’ main revenue source is financial charges paid by customers who carry 
balance each month.  The main costs of credit card companies include interest expense 
associated with the loans created by allowing customers to pay for their purchases after the issuer 
has paid the merchant, and charge-offs due to customers’ defaulting on their debts.  There exist 
substantial differences in profitability across customers.  The best customers are those who carry 
large balances while the worst are those who pay balances in full each month or, worse yet, file 
for bankruptcy.  In general, the best 20% customers of a credit card company generate more than 
125% of the profits for the firm.  We therefore use the following assumptions to model the 
difference across credit card users.  Table 1 provides a summary of all variables used in these 
assumptions. 
 
Assumption 1:  Each individual customer carries a monthly balance of bi, while the 
distribution of bi in the population is f(b).   
Assumption 2:  Each individual faces the possibility of bankruptcy or default at any 
time, which can be modeled as a Poisson process.  The bankruptcy probability for 
individual i is λi (per quarter), while the distribution of λ over individuals in the 
population is g(λ).  Customer bankruptcy forms a major cost for credit card issuers. 
Appendix A calculates annual bankruptcy rate of the entire population Cy, quarterly 
bankruptcy rate of the entire population Cq, conditional quarterly bankruptcy rate of 
customers with bankruptcy history in the past year Cq- and conditional quarterly 
bankruptcy rate of customers without bankruptcy history in the past year Cq+. 
  
Assumption 3:  An individual’s probability of bankruptcy is not correlated with the indi-
vidual’s outstanding card balance, and thus bi and λi are independent.  While this 
assumption is clearly not true for the population at large, Capital One argues 
convincingly that data did not contradict this assumption strongly during the initial attack 
period of their differential pricing strategy. 
Assumption 4:  There are a total number of N customers in the entire population. 
Despite the differences across customers, credit card companies historically charged uniform 
financial charge across customers, because the companies do not know who are their most 
profitable customers.   
Assumption 5:  There are two identical incumbent banks (CB and OB) initially split the 
market by half.  Both banks face capital cost rf. 
Assumption 6:  Before implementing a differential pricing strategy, and in the absence 
of any information on which to base pricing decisions, both banks charge customers the 
same interest rate of rs (per quarter). 
5.1. An Attacker with Differential Pricing 
Before Capital One transformed the industry through differential pricing, banks charged all their 
credit card customers the same interest rate for MasterCard and Visa balances, generally 19.8% 
annually. We now consider the possibility of an attacker with a differential pricing strategy, one 
that would enable it to identify high-balance revolvers, charge them lower rates, and attract them 
away from their current banks.7    
                                            
7  Revolvers are credit card holders who use their cards, accrue large balances, and pay them off slowly over time, 
paying finance charges each month as long as they maintain outstanding balances.  Revolvers are particularly 
attractive to monoline credit card issuers because they are their principal source of income.  Issuers earn money 
when credit card users pay finance charges; they lose money when transactors use the cards but pay their balances 
off each month, enjoying free loans while paying no finance charges. 
  
Assumption 7:  Before implementing a differential pricing strategy, banks do not main-
tain information about individual customers.  After the implementation, the bank knows 
each individual’s bi and bankruptcy history for the past year.  
Assumption 8:  The implementation of a differential pricing strategy by an incumbent 
bank has a defensive component aimed at reducing or eliminating loss of the most 
profitable customers to a new entrant attacker.  For customers with a balance of more 
than k who have not filed for bankruptcy in the past year, the bank will offer an attractive 
rate of rn.  For customers with a bankruptcy filing in the past year, they are offered 
secured credit cards at a premium rate of rp.  For the rest of the customers, the rate will 
stay at rs. The interest rate for high-balance customers is lower than the rate that was 
offered to all customers before differential pricing, which in turn is lower than the high-
risk rate offered to customers who have had a recent bankruptcy filing.   
Assumption 9:  No all customers are aware of the best credit card offers.  We use in-play 
ratio to represent percentage of customers that are actively comparing offers across credit 
card companies in a given quarter. The in-play ratio limits the speed with which 
customers will accept offers and switch banks, even when offers are as attractive as those 
being employed by the attackers here.  Only I customers are considering switching in 
each quarter.   
Assumption 10:  The implementation of a differential pricing strategy — either by a new 
entrant bank or by one of the incumbent banks following an aggressive differential 
pricing strategy — calls for the bank to offer rl  as the balance transfer rate for a year to a 
new customer, followed by rn for subsequent periods.8  The balance transfer interest rate 
is lower than the rate for subsequent periods, which in turn is less than the rate that was 
                                            
8 A balance transfer is a transfer of money a customer owes another creditor to a new credit card account. 
  
offered to all customers before differential pricing.  However, if a customer goes 
bankrupt after switching banks, the customer’s rate will be raised to the high-risk rate of 
rp.  Balance transfer products are offered to solicited new customers with a balance of 
more than k.  The bank only solicits customers from incumbents that have not 
implemented differential pricing strategy.  Once an incumbent implements information 
systems for differentiation pricing, it acquires profitability information on individual 
customers.  It can therefore use this information to selectively retain good customers and 
leave unprofitable customers to the attacker.  In equilibrium, the attacker stops soliciting 
customers from the incumbent due to the information disadvantage.      
Assumption 11:  Differential pricing cannot be implemented immediately.  It takes a 
bank L1 periods to develop the infrastructure needed to implement a differential pricing 
strategy and E1 is the cost of doing so.  L2 is the time taken to deploy this strategy once E1 
has been completed and E2 is the cost of doing so.  For simplicity, we assume that L2 is 
almost instantaneous and cost E2 almost zero.  The option value of investing E1 is the in-
cremental value of being ready to deploy differential pricing if attacked, conditioned by 
the timing and likelihood of attack. 
This is precisely the situation faced by Capital One in the mid-1990s.  With the benefit of 
hindsight, Capital One’s success can readily be explained: a bank’s most profitable credit card 
customers are those who pay their card balances off slowly, and these are precisely the customers 
who would be attracted by lower annual interest rates and the resulting lower monthly finance 
charges.  Unfortunately for competitors’ management teams, the nature of their appropriate 
response is significantly less intuitive.  Any actions that reduced the finance charges paid by the 
most attractive revolvers would greatly reduce profits unless accompanied by offsetting increases 
  
in finance charges for other customers (prohibited by state usury laws in most cases) or by 
reductions in the number of unprofitable customers being carried by the bank.  
 We consider the credit card industry at the time at which data mining and precision pricing was 
first introduced.  The Attacking Bank (AB) launches its precision pricing strategy and begins to 
attract high balance revolvers.  Creative Bank (one of two dominant players) has various 
strategic responses available to it.  The Other Bank (OB) simply ignores changes in the industry 
and maintains the status-quo.  We compare the strategies that CB may follow, and, in particular 
we compare them to the profits enjoyed by OB.    
6. Analysis 
6.1. Analysis of Alternative Strategies for Defenders — The Status Quo and the Value of 
Preserving It 
A casual analysis suggests that neither incumbent bank would want to move to differential 
pricing; with all customers initially being charged the maximum allowed under usury laws, 
cutting prices for some customers would not be matched by offsetting increases for others, and 
thus should inevitably reduce the profits for the entire industry.    
Case 1: Status Quo 
In the base case or status quo scenario, before the entry of AB, CB and OB split the entire 
market with total outstanding credit card debt of ( )∫∞
0
dbbbfN .  Each bank earns revenue from 
financial charges rs, and faces capital cost rf and charge-offs due to customer bankruptcy Cq.   
The profit of each firm can be calculated as ( ) ( )qfs CrrdbbbfN −−


 ∫∞
02
.  We use jXsP , to 
represent firm X’s earning in quarter j if it uses strategy s.  Therefore, we have 
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=
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Assuming 200,000 customers in a market with monthly credit card balances uniformly 
distributed between $0 and $3000, quarterly bankruptcy rates uniformly distributed between 0% 
and 2%, quarterly financial charge of 4% and capital cost of 1%, status quo brings 5-year earning 
streams with NPV of $16.943 million.   
Case 2: CB Initiates Preemptive Pricing Strategy 
Consider what happens if CB engages in data mining and differential pricing, changing its 
pricing strategy for its existing customer base but not offering a balance transfer product to 
attract new customers away from OB.  We assume that since they receive no immediate reward 
for doing so, customers do not transfer from OB to CB.  OB’s profit therefore remains the same 
as in Case 1.  CB, however, categorizes customers into three groups and charges them different 
rates: 1) customers that went bankrupt in the past year are offered secured credit cards with 
premium rate rp and collateral requirement for their credit card debts.  There are 2
yNC  customers 
in this category with average balance of ( )∫∞
0
dbbbf , producing a profit of 
( ) ( )fpy rrdbbbfNC −

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;9 2) customers with monthly balance over k are offered a preferential 
rate of rn.  ( ) 






 − ∫∞ dbbfCN
k
y
2
1
 customers are in this category with average balance +kB and 
                                            
9 There is no charge-offs because the credit card debts are secured by customers’ collaterals. 
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customers in this category carry an average balance −kB and have an average bankruptcy rate 
−qC .   Total profit from this group of customers is ( ) ( )fqskky rCrBdbbfCN −−
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Therefore, we have 
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Using the same example as in Case 1, we calculate that NPV of CB’s 5-year earning stream 
becomes reduced to $15.24 million while OB remains at $ 16.94 million.  Continuation of the 
status quo strategy of Case 1 is therefore preferable, and this strategy offers no reason for either 
bank to disturb the status quo.  
Case 3: CB Initiates Aggressive Pricing Strategy 
We now consider CB’s introducing defensive differential pricing to protect its own best accounts 
along with an aggressive balance transfer product to attract the best customers from OB, just the 
strategy that AB would have pursued if left an opening in the market.  However, any attack on 
OB’s customers base by a major incumbent competitor, following a strategy that looked like the 
initiation of a price war, would have received an immediate response.  As both firms are 
  
implementing aggressive pricing strategy, they once again split the market.  Each firm adopts 
exactly the same strategy as CB does in Case 2, except that for the ( ) 
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customers with balance over k, they are offered a one-year promotional rate rl for balance 
transfer followed by a preference rate rn.  Each firm therefore has two types of customers with 
balance over k: those who are still in promotion period and those who are not.  To calculate 
number of customers that need to be charged at the promotion rate rl, firms need to know number 
of customers switched during the last four quarters.  This number can be calculated as the 
difference between cumulative number of switched customers by the end of current quarter and 
that of a year ago.  Given in-play ratio of I, we therefore have ( ) ( )[ ]jj II −−− − 11 )4,0max(  
customers (in percentage) receive the promotional rate rl in the current quarter, while the rest are 
charged at the preferential rate rn.  Profit from customers with balance over k is therefore 
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In total, the profits of three firms are: 
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03 = P AB,j  
Not surprisingly, both banks earned more under the status quo scenario than they do when either 
attempts to introduce the strategy pursued by AB.   
6.2. Inevitability of Attack and the Need for Careful Response 
Case 4: CB and OB Do Nothing in Response to Attack 
This comfortable oligopoly enjoyed by CB and OB could not continue.  Figure 1 shows what 
happens when AB enters the industry with a strategy based upon data mining and differential 
pricing, effectively targeting the most attractive customers in the credit card portfolios of its 
competitors; neither CB nor OB is prepared to respond immediately.  The competitive situation 
of both CB and OB deteriorates after AB’s entry and the results are unacceptable for both 
defending banks.  Figure 1 was done under conditions favorable to defenders, with customers 
exhibiting only slow response to the attacker’s offers; even under conservative assumptions, 
failure to respond to AB’s attack is unacceptable for CB.    
---------------------------------------------- Figure 1 ---------------------------------------------------- 
With the entry of AB, both CB and OB start to lose customers.  But there are two types of 
customers staying with the incumbent firms.  The first type is customers who have not consider 
  
switching.  In quarter j, ( ) jI−1 of CB and OB’s customers (in percentage) are in this category.  
These customers are charged with standard rate rs, and have average quarterly bankruptcy rate of 
Cq and average monthly balance of ( )∫∞
0
dbbbf .  They generate a profit of 
( ) ( ) ( )fqsj rCrdbbbfNI −−


− ∫∞
02
1  for CB and OB respectively.  The second type is customers 
who have considered switching credit card issuers, but are not eligible for balance transfer offers.  
In Quarter j, ( ) jI−− 11  of incumbents’ customers (in percentage) have considered switching and 
( )∫
k
dbbf
0
of them (in percentage) are not eligible for balance transfer.  This group of customers is 
charged with standard rate rs, and has average quarterly bankruptcy rate of Cq and average 
monthly balance of Bk-.  CB and OB’s profits on this group are therefore 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )fqskkj rCrdbbfBNI −−
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11 .  Profits of AB can be calculated likewise.  We 
therefore have 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )
( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )
( )[ ] ( ) ( )fqn
k
k
j
fql
k
k
jj
AB,j
fqs
k
k
j
fqs
j
OB,j
fqs
k
k
j
fqs
j
CB,j
rCrdbbfBIN
rCrdbbfBIIN P
rCrdbbfBNIrCrdbbbfNI  P
rCrdbbfBNIrCrdbbbfNI P
−−


−−
+−−


−−−=
−−


−−+−−


−=
−−


−−+−−


−=
∫
∫
∫∫
∫∫
∞
+
−
∞
+
−
−
∞
−
∞
)4,0max(
)4,0max(4
00
4
00
4
11
11
2
11
2
1
2
11
2
1
 
6.3. Analysis of Alternative Strategies for Defenders — The Range of Alternatives and 
Conditions Determining Success 
  
CB does have a range of strategies available to it: 
• DP — (Differential Pricing only) Roll out data mining and differential pricing as quickly 
as possible (8 quarters), but do nothing in the short term to protect market share until data 
mining is available; 
• CPDP — (Cut Prices immediately while preparing for Differential Pricing) Cut prices for 
all accounts now to halt erosion of market share, while once again implementing data 
mining as quickly as possible, within 8 quarters; and 
• MODP — (Match Offers while preparing for Differential Pricing) Do not cut prices for 
any customers initially, but match the offers customers have received, for any customers 
who call to transfer their balances to AB, while once again implementing data mining as 
quickly as possible. 
A number of factors influence the attractiveness of each of these strategies.  Principal among 
them are the following two: 
• The in-play ratio I, that is, the rate at which customers consider switching their balances 
among banks simply because they have been offered a better rate.  As we discussed in 
Assumption 7, not all customers will considering switching credit card issuers at all time.  
For a given quarter, we assume only I (in percentage) customers will switch to a new 
credit card issuers if they are offered better rates. 
• The retention-effectiveness ratio R, that is, the percentage of customers who cancel 
their planned balance transfers from CB to AB when CB matches the offers that they 
have received.  
Assumption 12:  Retention-effectiveness is limited.  When a bank matches the interest 
rate that a competitor offered one of its high-balance customers as an incentive to 
  
motivate a balance transfer, the matching counter-offer will be effective only R (in 
percentage) of the time.  Retention-effectiveness is assumed to be the same across all 
players.   
 
6.4. Analysis of Alternative Strategies for Defenders — Examination of Specific Scenarios 
We will initially consider only strategies for defenders that are not based on their developing the 
infrastructure or performing the advanced training or other forms of preparation that are required 
to launch differential pricing.  We make this assumption since both incumbents were able to 
determine that their own deployment of differential pricing and their competitor’s inevitable 
response to it would damage both of them; thus, an investment in preparing for differential 
pricing would have negative value. 
We consider profitability of the three strategies mentioned in the previous section.   
Case 5: CB Does Nothing Until Ready to Replicate Strategy 
Given that CB does nothing until ready and the initial investment E1 takes L1 quarters to 
implement, its profits in the first L1 quarters will be exactly the same as in Case 4: 
If j < L1,  
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After L1, CB joins AB in attracting customers from OB.  Comparing it with the situation before 
L1, when AB gets customers from both CB and OB, it becomes obvious that AB’s incremental 
increase in its customer base after L1 is equivalent to one-fourth of what AB would have received 
without CB’s involvement, i.e. 
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receives the same incremental increase as AB does.  The outflow of customers from OB remains 
unchanged.  We therefore have, 
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Case 6: CB Drops Rates for All Existing Customers Until Ready to Replicate Strategy. 
In this case, CB drops all customers’ rates to AB’s promotional rate during L1.  This strategy 
helps CB keep all its customers until it implements data mining technology and gets more 
information about individual customers.  During L1, the 2
N  customers of CB will be charged 
with promotional rate rl.  It indicates a profit of ( ) ( )qfl CrrdbbbfN −−


 ∫∞
02
 for CB.  During the 
same period, AB gets all its customers from OB, which is half of what AB gets in Case 4, i.e. 
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; and OB’s customer outflow remains 
unchanged.  We therefore have 
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After L1, CB implements differential pricing strategy to its own customers and joins AB in 
attracting customers from OB.  As calculated in Case 2, CB gets a profit of 
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 from its original customer 
base.  In addition, it also attracts half of switching customers from OB.  Case 5 has calculated 
that these new customers contribute a profit of 
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 to CB.  Like CB, AB also gets half of 
switching customers from OB after L1, receiving a profit of 
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remains unchanged.  We therefore have, 
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Case 7: CB Matches Offers for Customers Attempting to Defect Until Ready to Replicate  
Rather than dropping rates for all customers, CB can choose to match rates if a customer receives 
a better offer from a rival firm.  This strategy does not affect rates charged to two types of 
customers discussed in Case 4.  The profit from customers who have not considered switching 
remains at ( ) ( ) ( )fqsj rCrdbbbfNI −−


− ∫∞
02
1 .  Likewise, the profit from customers who have 
considered switching credit card issuers, but are not eligible for balance transfer offers, stays at 
( )[ ] ( ) ( )fqskkj rCrdbbfBNI −−


−− ∫−
02
11 .  However, the strategy does affect rates charged to 
those customers who have monthly balancer over k and who are aware of offers from other 
firms.  For these ( ) 
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customers, they are offered by CB a promotional rate rl for the 
first year and a preferential rate rn for the remaining years if they receives offer from AB.  R 
customers (in percentage) choose to stay with the incumbent bank, while the remaining (1-R) 
choose to take AB’s offer.  These customers bring a profit of 
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AB, on the other hand, gets all switching customers from OB, in addition to the (1-R) switching 
customers from CB, resulting in a profit of 
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We therefore have 
If j < L1,  
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After L1, CB splits with AB of switching customers from OB.  As we have seen in previous 
cases, this group of customers generates a profit 
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Assigning specific values for the model parameters described in Case 1 allows us to calculate the 
implications for CB of each of the three strategies that could be used in response to attack from 
AB.  Assuming initially that in-play ratio I is a relatively high 50%, retention effectiveness R is 
only 25% and L1 is 8 quarters, Figures 2-4 illustrate the results of deploying each of these three 
strategies for these specific values.  Clearly, for these parameter values CB’s best strategy would 
be CPDP; that is, it should cut prices for all its existing customers immediately, to avoid losing 
its most profitable accounts to AB, and it should then implement informed differential pricing 
when it is able to do so, after 8 quarters.   
---------------------------------------------- Figure 2 ---------------------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------------- Figure 3 ---------------------------------------------------- 
---------------------------------------------- Figure 4 ---------------------------------------------------- 
 
The selection of CB’s best strategy depends upon the values assumed for in-play ratio I and 
retention ratio R.  Reducing I to 25% and increasing R to 75% changes the value of CB’s 
earnings.  Under DP, CB begins to prepare to match AB’s strategy, but does nothing until its 
  
infrastructure is available.  Over the long term CB does better with this strategy than OB, but it 
does reduce CB’s profits and the NPV of 5-year earnings are $14.43 million for CB and $11.77 
million for OB.  AB earns $4.22 million.  Alternatively, CB can employ CPDP in response to 
AB’s attack, immediately dropping its prices for all customers to avoid any loss of its good 
accounts to AB.  With low in-play ratio and high retention ratio, this is unnecessarily costly, and 
reduces NPV of 5-year earnings to $14.00 million, below those available to CB with strategy DP.  
OB continues to earn $11.77 and AB earns $2.53 million.  Finally, CB can employ MODP, 
matching the offers that its best customers receive from AB.   With NPV of 5-year earnings of 
$15.70 million this strategy is more profitable than DP or CPDP, and is better than the strategy 
followed by OB, which continues to earn $11.77 million.  AB earns $1.95 million.  Under low 
in-play ratio and high retention ratio, MODP is the preferred strategy.  With slow loss of 
accounts, there is limited pressure for CB to act immediately.  Moreover, with a high probability 
that matching offers will be effective, CB should cut prices only for those customers who begin 
to initiate the process to transfer their card balances to AB.  
6.5. Investing in Strategic Flexibility:  Calculating the Value of Advance Preparation for 
Differential Pricing 
Case 8: CB implements differential pricing immediately after attack 
Ignoring attack would be unacceptable for CB, while premature deployment of differential 
pricing dramatically reduces CB’s profitability.  There is another strategy, investing in 
preparation for data mining, and deploying it rapidly if and when a new entrant attacks.  In this 
case, CB splits with AB of all switching customers from day 1.  That is, both firms receive a 
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The value of this strategy-enabling partial investment can only be determined by examining the 
situation that would have obtained had the investment not been made.  Let us do a specific 
calculation before presenting the general framework, and let us assume that as in Figures 2-4 the 
in-play ratio is 50% and retention ratio is 25%.  The best alternative available to CB if it were to 
be attacked without advance preparation was shown to be the deployment of CPDP.  Let us 
examine one more strategy, CB’s early investment in preparation for data mining (PDP), to 
enable rapid deployment of differential pricing if and when CB is attacked.  This strategy is 
shown in Figure 5; clearly, this is vastly preferable to the three alternatives shown in Figures 2-4.   
---------------------------------------------- Figure 5 ---------------------------------------------------- 
With NPV of 5-year earnings of $16.63 million and acceptable short term profitability this is 
clearly the best strategic choice, better than those shown in Figures 2-4, and better than the corre-
sponding figure of $10.94 million earned by OB.  The incremental value of the investment in 
preparation is $4.25 million — the difference between the value of this strategy and the value of 
the best alternative, which was shown in Figure 2. 
Comparison of NPV(PDP) to the alternatives under each combination of parameter values allows 
us to calculate the value of advance preparation, assuming these parameter values and assuming 
that an attack does materialize.  
However, we do not know in-play ratio or retention ratio, and we cannot be sure if or when an 
attack will materialize.  The timing of attack is determined by AB, a hostile opponent.  The 
values of in-play ratio and retention ratio will only be known at the time of attack, and will be 
determined in part by environmental conditions and in part by strategic business decisions made 
by AB.  Consequently, calculating the value of advance preparation as a strategic option requires 
  
developing and using probability distributions for in-play ratio I, retention ratio R, and the time 
at which attack occurs. 
Assuming that I and R were known, the value of advance preparation as a function of probability 
of attack at time t could be computed from the following: 
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 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]{ }∫ −n
o
t
t
dttMODPNPVtCPDPNPVtDPNPVtPDPNPVtp ,,,,,max,  
 
Here, p(t) represents the probability of new entrant AB’s attack at time t, and NPV(s, t) 
represents the NPV, at the present time, of strategy s, if attack occurs at time t.  The integral is 
over time, from the lower to the upper bounds of the time period under consideration.  s∈Σ = 
{DP, CPDP, MODP} 
Of course the values of NPV(DP,t), NPV(CPDP,t), and NPV(MODP,t) depend upon the values 
of I and R. Hence, the complete functional form becomes: 
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Here, p(I) and p(R) represent the probability distributions assumed for these variables, which 
must be integrated over the bounds of their distribution.  The functional forms of NPV(s,t,I,R) 
have been extended to incorporate the dependence of the value of each strategy s upon the 
environmental context in which it is deployed, for s in {DP, CPDP, MODP}.   
 
For example, let us assume the following: 
•  The probability of attack is 90%, with a distribution that places greater weight on early 
entry 
•  In-play ratio has a discrete distribution that places 25% probabilities on the values of 25% 
and 75% and the remaining 50% probability on 50%. 
•  Retention ratio has a discrete distribution that places 25% probabilities on the values of 
25% and 75% and the remaining 50% probability on 50%. 
This enables us to calculate an expected value $1.88 million for the strategic option created by 
advance preparation.  (These calculations are described in Appendix C.)  Comparing the value of 
this strategic option to the cost of advance preparation allows us to determine if the investment is 
worth making. 
7. Conclusions 
This paper makes a modest contribution to our ability to evaluate strategic options in information 
technology infrastructure.  It shows how a systematic determination of sources of strategic 
uncertainty can lead to a general framework for valuation, which can be solved numerically even 
if it is not amenable to closed form analysis.  While this may not appear much like more 
formalistic approaches to options valuation, which are able to draw on a history of variance in 
  
the valuation of some traded instrument, it is entirely faithful to the spirit of options valuation, 
and indeed to the mathematics that underlies the more formal approaches. 
No simple, general, closed-form solution exists for the class of strategic options that we are 
exploring here.  Our technique is as general as we have been able to derive and, perhaps, as 
general as any likely to be developed.  Whether our technique is labeled sequential decision 
analysis for the value of strategy-enabling partial investments, or analysis of IT investments as 
strategic options, is of little importance.  This technique makes a modest contribution to allowing 
the decision maker to structure what he or she does know about the impact of an expected 
strategy, even in the complete absence of historical data on the value of the payoff from the 
investment.  Consequently, this technique makes a modest contribution towards allowing 
decision makers to employ strategic options theory as a technique to evaluate a wider class of 
investments intended to support future strategy. 
Our future plans for this work entail multiple lines of research: 
• Working with corporate IS managers to determine the extent to which the concept of strategy 
enabling partial investments is useful to them in their planning.  Preliminary discussions 
suggest that this work is indeed helpful.  For example, it was pointed out to us that much of 
the functionality of an information system innovation can be provided for much less than the 
total expected development cost.  If this initial investment is made soon enough, it provides 
some functionality as soon as users need it, and the rest of the functionality can be provided 
later if demand justifies it. 
• Working with corporate strategic planning officers to explore the extent to which scenario 
analysis can actually delimit the range of contexts in which an application may be deployed 
and the accuracy with which simulation can predict the value of specific initial investments 
  
under varying scenarios.  Again, preliminary experience with the several dozen times we 
have used scenario analysis suggests that it can be very effective in describing the full range 
of future environments.  Decades of professional experience of numerous OR professionals 
supports the idea that if we understand a phenomenon we can model it, at least in terms of 
the underlying parameters that determine valuation.  Of greater concern is the skepticism 
with which simulation modeling has been greeted any time it contradicted a decision maker’s 
prior plans, unsupported intuitions, or agenda. 
• Working to develop a broader range of case-based examples and experience with this 
combination of scenarios and simulations to produce an understanding of strategy enabling 
partial investments and real options. 
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Appendix A 
A.1. Bankruptcy Rate 
Lemma 1:  (bankruptcy rate of the general population)   
Individual i, with bankruptcy arrival-rate λi , has the probability of avoiding bankruptcy in a 
given quarter of e-λi.  Integrating across the general population, the expected rate of customer 
bankruptcy in any given quarter is ∫
∞
−−=
0
)(1 λλλ dgeCq .  The annual bankruptcy rate can be 
similarly calculated as ∫
∞
−−=
0
4 )(1 λλλ dgeC y  
Lemma 2:  (bankruptcy rate of customers with and without bankruptcy history in the past year) 
We first calculate the conditional distribution of λ for customers who have avoided bankruptcy 
in the past year 
∫
∫
∞
−
−
− =
0
4
0
4
)(
)(
)(
dxxge
dxxge
P
x
x
λ
λ .  Let its density function be )(λ−p .  The conditional 
quarterly bankruptcy rate of customers without bankruptcy in the past year is  
therefore ∫∞ −−− −=
0
)(1 λλλ dpeCq .   
Likewise, we calculate the conditional distribution of λ for customers who have filed bankruptcy 
in the past year 
∫
∫
∞
−
−
+
−
−
=
0
4
0
4
)(1
)(1
)(
dxxge
dxxge
P
x
x
λ
λ .  Let its density function be )(λ+p .  The conditional of 
  
quarterly bankruptcy rate for customer with bankruptcy in the past year is therefore 
∫∞ +−+ −=
0
)(1 λλλ dpeCq . 
A.2. Average Size of Balance Transfers 
Lemma 3:  (average monthly credit card balance of customers who are eligible (ineligible) for 
balance transfer) 
The threshold of balance transfer is k.  The average monthly credit card balance of customers 
who are eligible for balance transfer offer is therefore 
( )
( )∫
∫
∞
∞
+ =
k
k
k
dbbf
dbbbf
B .  The average of 
customers who are ineligible for balance transfer is therefore 
( )
( )∫
∫
=− k
k
k
dbbf
dbbbf
B
0
0 . 
A.3. NPV Calculations 
The NPV of each bank (CB, OB, or AB) for each of the seven strategies s described in the paper 
can be calculated as following ( )∑
∞
= += 1
1,
1 1
)()(
j
j
f
jX
s
X
s
r
LPLNPV , where X ∈ {CB, OB, AB} and s ∈ 
{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}.  The profit each bank earns from a strategy is a function of L1, the delay 
required to complete and install systems before its implementation.  The option value for 
enabling immediate implementation of a strategy s, instead of waiting for L1 periods before 
deploying it can thus be valued as )(max)0(max)( 11 LNPVNPVLV X
s
s
X
s
sX
−=  
  
Appendix B presents the results of performing these calculations for specific values of interest 
rates, bankruptcy rates, balances, in-play ratios and retention-effectiveness ratios.  Appendix C 
uses the results of appendix B to perform the calculations over probability distributions for in-
play ratios, retention-effectiveness ratios, and timing of AB’s attack. 
  
Appendix B: NPV Analysis 
NPV Analysis  
25% In Play 
75% Retention 
50% In Play 
25% Retention 
50% In Play 
75% Retention 
Case 1: Status Quo       
Creative Bank  $     16,943,262   $   16,943,262   $    16,943,262  
Other Bank  $      6,943,262   $   16,943,262   $    16,943,262  
Attacking Bank  $                  -     $                -     $                 -    
TOTAL  $      3,886,525   $   33,886,525   $    33,886,525  
Case 2: CB initiates preemptive 
pricing strategy       
Creative Bank  $      5,244,307   $   15,244,307   $    15,244,307  
Other Bank  $     16,943,262   $   16,943,262   $    16,943,262  
Attacking Bank  $                  -     $                -     $                 -    
TOTAL  $     32,187,569   $   32,187,569   $    32,187,569  
Case 3: CB initates aggressive 
pricing strategy       
Creative Bank  $      8,597,366   $   19,153,777   $    19,153,777  
Other Bank  $     11,772,576   $   10,943,265   $    10,943,265  
Attacking Bank  $                  -     $                -     $                 -    
TOTAL  $     30,369,942   $   30,097,042   $    30,097,042  
Case 4: CB and OB do nothing in 
response to attack     
Creative Bank  $     11,772,576   $   10,943,265   $    10,943,265  
Other Bank  $     11,772,576   $   10,943,265   $    10,943,265  
Attacking Bank  $       6,706,118   $     7,818,941   $      7,818,941  
TOTAL  $     30,251,271   $   29,705,471   $    29,705,471  
Case 5: CB does nothing until 
ready to replicate strategy       
Creative Bank  $     14,428,075   $   12,942,986   $    12,942,986  
Other Bank  $     11,772,576   $   10,943,265   $    10,943,265  
Attacking Bank  $       4,223,827   $     6,130,713   $      6,130,713  
TOTAL  $     30,424,478   $   30,016,965   $    30,016,965  
Case 6: CB drops rates for all 
exisitng customers until ready to 
replicate strategy     
Creative Bank  $     13,999,291   $   13,734,603   $    13,734,603  
Other Bank  $     11,772,576   $   10,943,265   $    10,943,265  
Attacking Bank  $       2,525,629   $     3,346,728   $      3,346,728  
TOTAL  $     28,297,496   $   28,024,596   $    28,024,596  
Case 7: CB matchs offers for 
customers attempting to defect 
until ready to replicate strategy       
Creative Bank  $     15,701,723   $   13,638,983   $    15,030,975  
Other Bank  $    11,772,576   $   10,943,265   $    10,943,265  
Attacking Bank  $       2,950,178   $     5,434,717   $      4,042,724  
TOTAL  $     30,424,478   $   30,016,965   $    30,016,965  
Appendix C: Option Value Calculation 
Option Valuation  
($ million) Lag          
In-Play/Retention 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 No Entry  
25/25 $2.07 $1.88 $1.67 $1.45 $1.21 $0.94 $0.65 $0.34 $0.00  
25/50 $1.64 $1.49 $1.33 $1.15 $0.96 $0.75 $0.52 $0.27 $0.00  
25/75 $1.22 $1.11 $0.99 $0.85 $0.71 $0.55 $0.38 $0.20 $0.00  
50/25 $3.46 $3.12 $2.76 $2.37 $1.97 $1.53 $1.06 $0.55 $0.00  
50/50 $2.86 $2.67 $2.43 $2.17 $1.85 $1.49 $1.06 $0.55 $0.00  
50/75 $2.17 $2.02 $1.84 $1.64 $1.40 $1.13 $0.81 $0.43 $0.00  
75/25 $3.80 $3.47 $3.11 $2.72 $2.30 $1.82 $1.29 $0.69 $0.00  
75/50 $3.63 $3.45 $3.11 $2.72 $2.30 $1.82 $1.29 $0.69 $0.00  
75/75 $2.77 $2.63 $2.45 $2.23 $1.96 $1.62 $1.20 $0.67 $0.00  
           
Probability           
In-Play/Retention 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 No Entry 
Marginal 
Probability 
25/25 1.25% 1.09% 0.94% 0.78% 0.63% 0.47% 0.31% 0.16% 0.63% 6.25% 
25/50 2.50% 2.19% 1.88% 1.56% 1.25% 0.94% 0.63% 0.31% 1.25% 12.50% 
25/75 1.25% 1.09% 0.94% 0.78% 0.63% 0.47% 0.31% 0.16% 0.63% 6.25% 
50/25 2.50% 2.19% 1.88% 1.56% 1.25% 0.94% 0.63% 0.31% 1.25% 12.50% 
50/50 5.00% 4.38% 3.75% 3.13% 2.50% 1.88% 1.25% 0.63% 2.50% 25.00% 
50/75 2.50% 2.19% 1.88% 1.56% 1.25% 0.94% 0.63% 0.31% 1.25% 12.50% 
75/25 1.25% 1.09% 0.94% 0.78% 0.63% 0.47% 0.31% 0.16% 0.63% 6.25% 
75/50 2.50% 2.19% 1.88% 1.56% 1.25% 0.94% 0.63% 0.31% 1.25% 12.50% 
75/75 1.25% 1.09% 0.94% 0.78% 0.63% 0.47% 0.31% 0.16% 0.63% 6.25% 
Marginal Probability 20.00% 17.50% 15.00% 12.50% 10.00% 7.50% 5.00% 2.50% 10.00% 100.00% 
           
Option Value $1.89           
Option Variance $1.03          
 
 
Table 1: Definition of Variables 
Variables Descriptions 
bi Average unpaid monthly credit card balance carried by customer i. 
Bk+ 
Average unpaid monthly balance of all customers who are eligible for balance 
transfer offer 
Bk- 
Average unpaid monthly balance of all customers who are not eligible for balance 
transfer offer 
λi 
Quarterly bankruptcy rate of customer i (modeled as arrival rate in a Poisson 
process) 
Cy Annual bankruptcy rate among the entire population 
Cq Quarterly bankruptcy rate among the entire population 
Cq+ Quarterly bankruptcy rate among customers with bankruptcy history in the past year 
Cq- 
Quarterly bankruptcy rate among customers without bankruptcy history in the past 
year 
I 
In-play ratio: percentage of customers considering switching credit cards in any 
given quarter 
R 
Retention ratio: percentage of customers staying with their current credit card issuers 
if the issuers match rates offered by rivals 
k 
 
For new customers: threshold of monthly balance that eligible for balance transfer 
For existing customers: threshold of monthly balance to quality for preferential rate 
rn.    
rs 
Before implementing differential pricing strategy: standard rate charged to all credit 
card customers  
After implementing differential pricing strategy: standard rate charged to customers 
with monthly balance of less than k. 
rl 12-month special promotional rate for balance transfer customers.  
rp 
Premium rate charged to secured credit card customers (customers who defaulted in 
the past year) 
rn Preferential rate for customers with monthly balance over k.    
L1 The delay required to complete and install systems before its implementation 
N Number of customers 
j Quarter index 
  
Figure 1: CB does nothing in response to AB’s attack 
CB Does Nothing in Response
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AB begins its attack.  Neither CB nor OB responds.  NPV of profits of both incumbent banks are 
reduced to $10.94 million, while AB enjoys profits of $7.82 million. 
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Value 
  
Figure 2: CB does nothing until Ready to Replicate Strategy 
CB Does Nothing Until Ready to Replicate Strategy
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AB begins its attack.  OB does nothing.  CB begins to prepare to match AB’s strategy, but does 
nothing until its infrastructure is available.  Clearly this works better than OB’s strategy, but with 
high in-play ratio it results in the loss of too many good accounts to AB before CB is ready to 
implement differential pricing.  The NPV of CB’s 5-year earnings is reduced to $12.94 million.  
This is better than OB’s strategy of doing nothing, which results in NPV of earnings being 
reduced to $10.94 million, but CB still loses too many good accounts before it is ready to act .  
Value 
Time (Quarter)
  
Figure 3: CB drops rates for all until ready to replicate strategy 
CB Drops Rates for All Until Ready to Replicate Strategy
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AB begins its attack.  CB responds by dropping its prices for all customers to avoid any loss of 
its good accounts to AB.  With high in-play ratio the large majority of CB’s best accounts would 
have left in the two years it takes CB to replicate AB’s strategy and this defensive move pre-
serves all of these accounts.  The NPV of CB’s earnings is preserved and CB earns $13.74 mil-
lion, but the short-term impact may be unacceptable.  Once again, OB earns $10.94 million.  AB 
earns $3.35 million. 
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Figure 4: CB matches offers until ready to replicate strategy 
CB Matches Offers Until Ready to Replicate Strategy
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AB begins its attack.  CB responds by attempting to match the offers that its best customers 
receive from AB.  With high in-play ratio, many of CB’s accounts are at risk each month, but 
with low retention ratio matching their offers is rarely effective in persuading customers to 
remain with CB.  CB earns $13.63 million, while OB once again earns $10.94 million.  This 
strategy is less profitable for CB than dropping rates for all customers but the short-term effects 
are better. 
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Figure 5: CB implements differential pricing immediately after attack 
CB Implements Differential Pricing Immediately after Attack
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Rapid deployment of differential pricing enables CB to respond to attack from AB.  
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